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And Not a Drop to Drink: Admiralty Law and the BP
Well Blowout
John Costonis∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier Essay, I questioned whether the BP Macondo well
blowout qualifies as an admiralty tort.1 The blowout scenario
features BP’s exploratory oil and gas well and Transocean’s
Deepwater Horizon, a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU). I
appreciated then as now that my approach to the question’s
resolution diverges from a framework (Fifth Circuit Model)
employed by commentators and federal courts within the Federal
Fifth Circuit to assess torts occasioned by injuries or deaths of
workers atop Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas drilling
platforms.
Confirmation appeared shortly thereafter in Professor David
Robertson’s reply essay2 and in the Federal Eastern District of
Louisiana’s opinion in the BP MDL B-1 Bundle Order and Ruling
(B-1 Bundle).3
Both look to the Fifth Circuit Model to characterize the
blowout as an admiralty event. Paralleling my original and present
essays, both focus on what B-1 Bundle terms “all claims for private
or ‘non-governmental economic loss and property damages.’”4
These claims, which exclude oil-platform-worker personal injury
and death claims, correspond with the inventory of economic–
property losses labeled “covered damages” in section 2702(b) of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).5
Copyright 2012, by JOHN COSTONIS.
∗ Chancellor Emeritus and Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Professor Costonis gratefully acknowledges the
support of the LSU Law Center Research Support program and the helpful
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1. See John Costonis, The Macondo Well Blowout: An Admiralty Tort?, 59
LA. B. J. 28 (2011).
2. David W. Robertson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues in OCS Oil
Spill Cases, 59 LA. B. J. 344 (2012).
3. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico,
on April 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011) [hereinafter B-1 Bundle].
4. Id. at 947.
5. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (2006) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). B-1 Bundle also addresses
claims for punitive damages, which, although allowed under general maritime
law, are not included in OPA section 2702(b).
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Despite the applicability of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA)6 to the Macondo blowout, Professor Robertson
asserts that “a vessel-related oil spill into the waters over the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) is [no] less an admiralty matter than a
spill into high seas beyond the OCS or into state waters inshore of
the OCS.”7
B-1 Bundle comes to the same result by employing the Fifth
Circuit Model and, largely, the same precedents as Professor
Robertson.8 The blowout qualifies as an admiralty tort, according
to B-1 Bundle, because it meets the two standards essential to
water-borne status decreed in the United States Supreme Court
decision in Executive Jet Aviation Company v. City of Cleveland9
and its progeny:10 location and a “substantial relation to a
6. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1331–1356a (2006 & Supp. III 2009)) [hereinafter OCSLA].
7. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345.
8. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, unlike Professor Robertson or my
original essay, also addresses the issue of OPA’s displacement of general
maritime law. It held that, subject to an exception obligating claimants suing
OPA responsible parties to satisfy the procedural requirements of OPA section
2713, OPA and OCSLA do not displace general maritime law. Three
consequences attend this stunningly aggressive holding, which affords private
claimants a parallel track alongside OCSLA–OPA to press their property- and
economic-loss claims. First, claimants may bring general maritime law actions
seeking the same damages under that law that are defined as “covered damages”
under OPA section 2702(b). Second, OPA’s silence regarding punitive damages
does not bar their pursuit under general maritime law. Finally and by implication
rather than statement, OPA’s express displacement of the Limited Liability Act
of 1851, now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006), in OPA section
2718(a) and (c) does not bar consideration of OPA’s “covered damages” under
the Act’s procedures so long as the claims are packaged for assertion via the
parallel track afforded by general maritime law. Subject to the foregoing
exception, these claims may be asserted against all of the blowout’s potentially
liable parties (e.g., Cameron, Halliburton, and others), despite OPA section
2713, which restricts B-1-type claimants to actions against “responsible parties”
alone. The present Essay identifies a variety of problematic outcomes owing to
the Fifth Circuit’s self-confessed appetite for the “reflexive invocation of
admiralty jurisdiction,” which arise in this Essay’s inquiry into Macondo’s
status as an admiralty tort. Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087
(5th Cir. 1990). Admiralty-aggressive outcomes are no less prominent, however,
in B-1 Bundle’s grant of the parallel track to general maritime law. In view of
the unwieldiness of addressing both the admiralty jurisdiction and admiralty
displacement issues in a single study, the author is preparing an independent
essay addressing the latter.
9. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1989); Sisson
v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). B-1 Bundle specifically references the lastnamed of this triad.
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traditional maritime activity” (SRTMA). As a MODU, the
Deepwater Horizon satisfies the first because it is a “vessel in
navigable waters.”11 Macondo’s Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
drilling operations comply with the SRTMA principle,12 it is
claimed, in line with Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corporation’s holding
that “oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is
recognized to be maritime commerce.”13
Robertson and B-1 Bundle discern no differences at all between
the Macondo blowout and the Exxon Valdez spill, or between
Macondo and the personal injury–indemnity contract scenario
addressed in Theriot. They likewise equate the Deepwater Horizon
with the Super Scoop dredging barge, which the United States
Supreme Court deemed a “vessel” in Stewart v. Dutra
Construction Company.14
The Exxon Valdez spill occurred in state waters, however, and
was entirely sourced from a vessel.15 Macondo, in contrast,
featured two discharges, each of which originated from a situs
identified in OCSLA.16 Some 4.9 million barrels issued from the
OCS seabed, denominated by OCSLA as an exclusive federal
enclave and a component of the nation’s public lands.17 As a
“temporarily attached device” (TAD),18 the Deepwater Horizon
MODU likewise qualifies as an OCSLA situs.19
11. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 950 (quoting Jerome B. Grubart,
Inc., 513 U.S. at 535).
12. Id. at 951.
13. 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. 543 U.S. 481 (2005).
15. A sobering and decidedly more realistic perspective on the functional
nonequivalence of non-OCS vessel-related oil spills and OCS well blowouts
appears in a separate statement from congressional testimony on OPA offered
by Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger, and Graham, who prefigured the
Macondo tragedy in their warning that:
[v]essels––even extremely large ones such as the Amoco Cadiz and the
Exxon Valdez––carry finite supplies of oil, and usually only a portion
of the cargo is lost because it is compartmentalized . . . . [But] OCS
[blowouts] . . . can involve prodigious and seemingly unlimited
quantities of crude oil. The size of such spills can sometimes fill
hundreds or even thousands of tankers the size of the Exxon Valdez.
See S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 26–27 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
722, 748–49.
16. OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) covers the BP well as a “fixed structure”
located on the “subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf”; OCSLA
section 1333(a)(1) addresses the Deepwater Horizon MODU in its reference to
“temporarily attached” devices employed in the extraction of the OCS seabed’s
resources. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2006).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. The phrase is derived from OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) which states in
relevant part:
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Stewart predicated the Super Scoop’s status as a “vessel” on
general maritime law.20 Neither OPA nor OCSLA played any role
in Stewart because the Super Scoop was dredging a trench in
Boston Harbor territorial waters. Stewart’s plaintiff, a worker
aboard the dredging barge, sought compensation for personal
injuries incurred during the dredging program.
The Deepwater Horizon MODU, on the other hand, was
connected by a drillstring to its OCS seabed source and was
completing the exploratory phase of BP’s OCS drilling operations
when the blowout occurred. Macondo’s parties are inland-andcoastal private claimants seeking recompense for economic and
property losses incurred 50 miles or more from the MODU in
many cases. The vessel or nonvessel status of the Deepwater
Horizon MODU, moreover, is governed by statutes––OCSLA
section 1333(a)(1) and OPA section 2701––not by general
maritime law.21
Professor Robertson22 and B-1 Bundle23 agree that Theriot
sustains their claim that OCS oil and gas drilling meets Executive
Jet’s SRTMA criterion. The Theriot action, however, originated
neither from a spill nor a blowout, but from an oil barge
employee’s injury that gave rise, in turn, to an indemnity contract
action between his employer and the oil and gas lessee. Sited on
Galveston Bay, rather than on OCS waters, and occurring prior to
OPA’s adoption, the incident was governed neither by OCSLA
(given its location) nor by OPA (given its date). At issue in Theriot
was not a tort, as in Macondo, but a “maritime contract” governed
by general maritime law.24

The Constitution and laws . . . of the United States are extended to the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial
islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom . . . .
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002)
(qualifying a MODU as an OCSLA situs for purposes of OCSLA sections
1333(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A)), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard,
Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F. 3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
20. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. 543 U.S. 481 (2005). Stewart’s immediate
source for its definition of “vessel” is the codification of the general maritime
law concept in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 117–29.
22. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346.
23. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011).
24. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Ignored by Robertson and B-1 Bundle, moreover, is the most
telling distinction between the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA-related tort
model and the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort cause of action
(Macondo Tort):
The Model is driven by the Circuit’s disposition towards
securing damages or other compensation for workers atop
OCS platforms (whether or not “fixed structures”)
suffering accidental injury or death. The Macondo Tort, in
contrast, encompasses an off-platform regional population
of over 100,000 claimants who have suffered economic and
property loss in consequence of an OCS oil discharge.
The distinction between the two causes of action has gone
unnoticed because the BP blowout is the first Fifth Circuit dispute
of record in which an appreciation of these differences is essential
to the dispute’s resolution. Fifth Circuit reports feature one
category of cases evaluating OCSLA platform-worker torts and
another addressing OPA economic-loss torts. But the reports lack a
single decision addressing the uniquely configured OCSLA–OPA
Macondo Tort.25 Only the rarest of OCS blowouts (and, rarer still,
of OCS vessel spills) are likely to feature the volume of oil
required to inflict private claimant property and economic losses
on coastal and inland locations far removed from the pertinent
OCS drilling operations.26
Despite Professor Robertson’s indifference to the territorial
versus over-OCS waters distinction, OCSLA’s role as an essential
component of the tort cannot be ignored. OCSLA, the Supreme
Court has declared, “define[s] a body of law applicable to the
seabed, the subsoil and the . . . structures . . . on the Outer

25. The author’s review of reported decisions by Fifth Circuit courts
(district and appellate) discloses only one case discussing both OCSLA and
OPA as components of its pertinent cause of action. But the case’s key facts—
the presence of an OCS fixed platform rather than MODU, the status of the
platform’s owner as the OPA claimant rather than as a responsible party
(defendant), and an allision involving contact of the defendant’s seismic cable
with a leg of the platform—materially distinguish the case from the B-1 Bundle
fact pattern. See Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp.
1008 (E.D. La. 1993). The OCS rig’s owner, who experienced a well “shut-in”
in consequence of the discharge of oil from the defendant’s seismic cable,
sought relief under OPA section 2702(b)(2)(E) for the economic losses
associated with the shut-in.
26. Similar considerations likely account for the absence of reported
litigation concerning claims under OCSLA title III, which dealt with similar
economic losses prior to its repeal in 1990. See infra text accompanying notes
119–26.
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Continental Shelf.”27 OPA is no less essential to the tort, of course,
because, as B-1 Bundle itself acknowledges, the statute “governs . . .
private claims for property damage and economic loss resulting
from a discharge of oil in navigable waters.”28 The Macondo Tort,
in short, inextricably engages both statutes in this unique
configuration.
A. The Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo Tort: A Comparison
The Macondo and the Fifth Circuit Model torts share only their
common occurrence on OCSLA situses. Macondo’s private
plaintiffs inhabit entire coastal and inland areas; the Model’s tort
claimants are workers atop oil drilling rigs. The former seek
recovery for their economic and property losses; the latter for
personal injury or death. The former’s “covered damages” under
OPA section 2702(b) encompass a range of economic and property
loss injuries extrinsic to the Model’s physical injury–death
categories, as the latter are processed in admiralty wrongful death,
negligence, and statutory compensation schemes.
Macondo defines the status of MODUs through a complex web
of OCSLA and OPA statutory terms; the Model, by Stewart’s allinclusive general maritime law definition. The former pits two
nonadmiralty federal statutes––OCSLA and OPA—against judgemade general maritime law, insuring displacement by the former of
the latter in the event of conflict. The Model’s recurrent
competitors in OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) contests are federal
general maritime law and state law, either ex proprio vigore or as
OCSLA-endorsed surrogate federal law.29 This pairing guarantees
the former’s victory under the Model, which favors admiralty law
when it is deemed to apply “of its own force.”30
27. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
28. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953. Public agencies and other
nonprivate entities may also pursue damage claims under OPA section 2702(b).
The structural distinctions between the Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo
Tort format are detailed at greater length in John Costonis, The Macondo Well
Blowout: Taking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Seriously, 42 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 511, 519–21 (2011) [hereinafter JMARC].
29. OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) provides in relevant part that:
[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with . . .
other Federal laws . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent
State . . . are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion
of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
islands and fixed structures erected thereon . . . .
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006).
30. See, e.g., B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953; Demette v. Falcon
Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Grand
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Finally, the values at stake in Macondo receive expression in
OCSLA’s 1978 version, which incorporates a “new statutory
regime”31 to protect the ecological integrity of the OCS and coastal
areas through interlocking regulatory and liability strategies
designed to prevent or remediate oil discharge damages. The
Model, on the other hand, adheres strictly to OCSLA’s original
1953 version, which focused narrowly on worker welfare atop
drilling rigs and ignored OCS drilling’s environmental costs,
thereby enabling polluters to shift these costs to the victims of their
oil discharges.32
These differences give rise to five considerations that contest
Robertson–B-1 Bundle’s classification of the Macondo Tort as an
admiralty tort. The first is the imperative that the Model’s
framework creates for labeling the rigs auxiliary to OCS drilling
operations as “vessels.”
Critical to supportive worker outcomes is, first, the status of the
employees (as seamen, as longshoremen or harborworkers, or as
platform workers not engaged in maritime employment) and,
second, the status of oil and gas drilling rigs (as “fixed platforms”
or as “vessels”). The Fifth Circuit has striven to classify MODUs
as “vessels” in order to extend to platform worker “seamen” the
benefits of the Jones Act33 and general maritime tort law. The
Circuit has likewise generously construed the concept of “maritime
employment” to bring nonseamen platform workers under the
coverage of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA).34

Isle Shipyard Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith
v. Penrod Drilling Co., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, 589 F.3d 778. The “of its own accord” doctrine
has been criticized as inconsistent with both the text and legislative history of
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), as well as with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the section in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395
U.S. 352. See Demette, 280 F.3d at 504–10 (DeMoss, J., dissenting); JMARC,
supra note 28, at 519–20, 535.
31. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1461.
32. See JMARC, supra note 28 at 530, 533.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006). A powerful value driving OCSLA upon its
adoption in 1953 was the protection of the social welfare of platform workers.
Because Congress assumed that most of the latter would be from states adjacent
to platforms, it called for OCSLA-endorsed adjacent state law to apply to
platform events as surrogate federal law under OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A),
absent an applicable federal law. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 530, 533–34.
34. Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
901–950 (2006)). The term “maritime employment” appears in section 902(3).
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Offshore Company v. Robison,35 the judicial icon of the Jones
Act–vessel pairing, illustrates the former observation. Writing over
a half-century ago, Judge Minor Wisdom observed that “[t]he
[Jones] Act has always been construed liberally, but recent
decisions have expanded the coverage of the Jones Act to include
almost any workman sustaining almost any injury while employed
on almost any structure that once floated or is capable of floating
on navigable waters.”36 Buttressed today by the Supreme Court’s
Stewart decision, the 1959 Robison decision continues as the
centerpiece of Fifth Circuit decisions generally and in B-1 Bundle
itself as the basis for equating MODUs with “vessels.”37
Related efforts to extend the label of “maritime employment”
for purposes of securing LHWCA compensation for platform
workers are evident as well. In its Herb’s Welding v. Gray
decision,38 for example, the Fifth Circuit extended the label to a
welder aboard a fixed platform engaged in OCS drilling.39
The second of the five considerations is that the disposition to
view all oil drilling rigs as “vessels” obscures the opposition to a
“vessel” label reflected both in OCSLA’s 1978 characterization of
MODUs as TADs and, less definitively, of OPA’s definition of key
terms bearing on the Deepwater Horizon’s status.40 Reasoning
designed to support workers atop drilling platforms is simply not
covariant with the OCSLA–OPA goal of compensating coastal–
inland oil-discharge private victims.41
35. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). That the Robison injury occurred in
territorial waters and almost two decades prior to OCSLA ’78’s TAD
amendment has gone unremarked in the half-century since its decision, as
evidenced by the prominence accorded it, not only by B-1 Bundle and Professor
Robertson, but also by virtually every other Fifth Circuit opinion on which both
rely to support their identification of OCS MODUs as “vessels.” Perhaps a
MODU is a “vessel.” If so, the honors go not to Robison, but to the OCSLA–
OPA statutory definitions (in particular, those of OPA defining a “mobile
offshore drilling unit” and a “vessel”), and then only after vanquishing
OCSLA’s treatment of MODUs as TADs. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. Robison, 266 F.2d at 771 (emphasis added).
37. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (E.D. La. 2011).
38. 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 470 U.S. 414 (1985).
39. The scope of “maritime employment” endorsed in this Fifth Circuit
opinion was rejected by the Supreme Court, however, as overly generous in the
Herb’s Welding appeal. See Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 404 (1985); infra
text accompanying notes 85–90.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.
41. Illustrative is an observation vented in congressional hearings
supporting OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 to extend the statute’s coverage to
TADs while adding a new OCSLA title III pollution prevention and liability
regime. Drilling activities conducted from exploration platforms, such as the
Deepwater Horizon MODU, present greater dangers of blowouts and spills than
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The third is trivializing the hostility to “traditional maritime
principles” of OCS drilling operations and of the associated
OCSLA–OPA pollution liability regime. This consequence is
explored in Part II’s rebuttal of Robertson–B-1 Bundle’s insistence
that the Macondo blowout is SRTMA-compliant.
The fourth is the contribution of the “all drilling rigs are
vessels” mindset to the rebuff that a distressing number of Fifth
Circuit OCSLA opinions have experienced before the United
States Supreme Court. The latter’s multiple reversals and
overrulings seek to restrain, as contrary to Congressional will or
the Court’s own jurisprudence, the Circuit’s expansive appetite for
admiralty that usually, but not invariably, links up with its
determined support for seafaring worker remedies.42
Finally, B-1 Bundle views the Macondo Tort from the wrong
end of the telescope by commencing with admiralty law and
jurisdiction, and, as in B-1 Bundle itself, shaping the initial form

activities conducted from the fixed platforms employed for OCS development
and production operations. In view of congressional testimony affirming these
greater risks, excluding TADs from OCSLA’s coverage in the Macondo Tort
setting (by deeming them “vessels”) while including the less risky fixed
platforms is perverse. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1977, Part 2: Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 875–915 (1977) (response of Paul “Red” Adair,
Red Adair Oil Well Fires and Blowouts Control Co., Houston TX, to committee
member questions probing the comparative danger of blowouts from
semisubmersibles versus permanent platform drilling structures).
42. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969)
(reversing two Fifth Circuit decisions below and undermining the Circuit’s
decision in Snipes v. Pure Oil Co., 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961), which favored
the applicability of admiralty law to accidents occurring on permanent drilling
platforms); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(reversing a Circuit ruling that Louisiana’s wrongful death statute applies ex
proprio vigore in waters above the OCS); Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421
(overruling Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981),
and reversing as “untenable” the Circuit’s holding that “offshore drilling is
maritime commerce”); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1986)
(reversing a Circuit ruling as “subvert[ing] the congressional intent documented
in Rodrigue . . . that admiralty doctrines should not apply under [OCSLA]”);
Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 686–87 (2012)
(overruling the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Mills v. Director, 877 F.2d 356 (5th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), that a “situs of injury” rather than “substantial nexus”
between an injury and OCS drilling operations test determines LHWCA
compensation pursuant to OCSLA section 1333(b)); cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 619 (1978) (reversing the Fifth Circuit ruling that
survivors of deceased worker are entitled to general maritime law loss-of-society
damages despite their disallowance under the Death on the High Seas Act).
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and sequence of an entire MDL proceeding on general maritime
law principles, holding OCSLA and OPA largely in reserve.43
The Circuit’s management of OCS platform-worker tort claims
is neither tainted by nor the target of this criticism.44 The welfare
of workers at sea is a centuries-long commitment, heritage, and
emblem of admiralty law and its expertise. However problematic
in the Macondo setting, the Circuit’s pride in the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction on behalf of seafarers is evident throughout
its OCSLA jurisprudence. Rightly, the Circuit takes pride in its
status as the nation’s preeminent venue for the development of law
at the intersection of admiralty and oil and gas operations.45 It
holds sway over an area of the lower 48 states in which the lion’s
share of United States’ offshore drilling is conducted.46
But the Macondo Tort totters on admiralty’s far periphery, if
indeed it respects this boundary at all. OCS drilling operations and
their governance are post-1950 developments that feature
environmental, public safety, and liability allocation issues of

43. See supra note 8. Appreciating the likely contentiousness of the
statement in text, the author has reserved its discussion and defense to an entire
essay in progress.
44. Other than the objection in text to uncritically transferring reasoning
appropriate to the Fifth Circuit Model to the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort, the
author’s uneasiness with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence is limited essentially to the
Circuit’s application of admiralty law as applying “of its own force” in the
absence of evidence in relevant circumstances of congressional intent that
admiralty law should override OCSLA. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 534–40;
infra text accompanying note 107.
45. The Fifth Circuit’s preeminence appears in a comparison of the number
of opinions on the issues immediately relevant to this Essay decided by the
Federal Fifth Circuit and its district-level trial courts with those of the nation’s
other eleven federal circuits and their associated trial courts, using as the
comparison’s database all non-United States Supreme Court federal cases cited
in THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW (5th ed. 2011).
The sampling derives from opinions cited by Professor Schoenbaum in Chapter
3, section 3-6 (Admiralty Jurisdiction: What is a Vessel?) and section 3-9
(Admiralty Jurisdiction: Continental Shelf Operations), and in Chapter 7,
section 7-3 (Longshore and Harbor Worker: Offshore Workers). Among other
topics, these sections exhaustively address vessel versus nonvessel distinctions;
OCSLA jurisdiction with respect to OCS operations and activities; and the
LHWCA–OCS interface as it relates to the coverage of OCS platform workers
under the LHWCA. The combined total of cases cited, respectively, under these
headings is as follows:
Opinions from the Federal Fifth Circuit and its District courts: 127
Opinions from the 11 other Federal Circuits and their District Courts: 13.
46. QUEST OFFSHORE RES. INC., THE STATE OF THE OFFSHORE U.S. OIL AND
GAS INDUSTRY iii n.1 (2011), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/
Files/Policy/Exploration/Quest_2011_December_29_Final.ashx.
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profound scientific, economic, legal, and policy complexity.47
Congress and federal agencies have been addressing these issues
through myriad statutes, including OCSLA and OPA, that are
grounded in the Property and Interstate and Foreign Commerce
clauses, not in the Admiralty Clause.48
Macondo most surely is the worst environmental–oil pollution
discharge disaster in the nation’s history. Judge-made general
maritime law has proven itself no match for assessing or
addressing an event of this character and magnitude. Furthermore,
it has long espoused procedural and substantive values––shaped in
large part by shipping and insurance interests––that have been
either indifferent or flatly antithetical to those championed by the
current OCSLA–OPA pollution prevention and liability regime.49
Were general maritime law up to the task, of course, there would
have been no need for the federal government’s lengthy, recurring
efforts to detail the contours of a private cause of action, such as
that originally defined in OCSLA’s former title III, and since
carried over into OPA.50
A summary of federal legislative efforts begins with
Congress’s adoption in 1953 of OCSLA in its original form.
OCSLA, the Supreme Court declared in 1969 in Rodrigue v. Aetna
47. For a comprehensive inventory and review of these issues, see NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING (REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT) pts. II & III (2011) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S REPORT].
48. See infra notes 125–26.
49. The transition from judge-made general maritime law’s primitive efforts
to formulate both a rationale and a remedial system for the action I have
described as the Macondo Tort, as well as the hostility of the resulting law’s
procedural and substantive principles to the values incorporated in the OCSLA–
OPA private cause of action are detailed in, e.g., PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra
note 47, at chs. 7–10; Lawrence Kiern, Liability, Compensation, Financial
Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First
Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 507–89 (2000). Reflective of the clash is
Congress’s rejection in OPA of the “Robins Doctrine” as a bar to economic loss
claims, see 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2006); of the application of the Limited
Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006), to the calculation of
OPA response costs and damages, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), (c); of the
procedure pursuant to which all private claims for OPA’s “covered damages”
against “responsible parties” must mandatorily be pursued, see 33 U.S.C. §§
2702(b)(2), 2713(a)–(d); and, more comprehensively, of OPA’s nonobstante
clause barring admiralty law insofar as OPA provisions so dictate, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 2751(e). If any of the three arguments offered in this Essay countering the
admiralty claim for the Macondo Tort is correct, it merits emphasis, section
2751(e) does not “save” admiralty law or jurisdiction because the tort falls
outside of the former’s potential “savings” coverage.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51–60.
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Casualty & Surety Company, was intended to “define a body of
law applicable to the seabed, the subsoil and the . . . structures . . .
on the Outer Continental Shelf.”51 OCSLA ’53’s legislative
history, as carefully evaluated by Rodrigue, disdains admiralty law
as OCS governing law.52 Responding to coastal states’ post-Santa
Barbara distress over the many intervening oil spills, Congress
refashioned OCSLA in 1978 as a “new statutory regime” designed
to “prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well
control, fires . . . or other occurrences which may cause damage to
the environment or to property, or endanger life or health.”53
Congress could not have spoken more directly to Macondo’s core
issue and corresponding remedial program, particularly as the
latter was subsequently refined and expanded by OPA.
In service to these goals, Congress amended OCSLA section
1333(a)(1) in 1978 to add TADs as OCSLA situses alongside the
1953 version’s “fixed structures.”54 A new title III defined the
refashioned statute’s allocation of liability for blowouts, fires, and
spills.55 Congress converted MODUs from “vessels” into “offshore
facilities”56 to support OCSLA’s new statutory remedies for offplatform private economic and property losses. OCSLA ’78 set
forth a self-contained, nonadmiralty regime buttressed by the
“polluter pays” principle to compensate private claimants for these
losses.57
Following the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, Congress
unanimously adopted OPA, which the Senate Public Works and
Environmental Committee portrayed as a “single Federal law
providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability from oil
pollution.”58 Consolidated and harmonized within this single act
were major elements of four existing oil pollution statutes,
including OCSLA’s title III.59 Congress substituted OPA title I for
51. 395 U.S. 352, 356 (1969).
52. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 530–37.
53. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203(a) (1978).
55. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 301–315 (1978).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 119–26.
57. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 540–51.
58. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
730. OPA, the Committee added, was designed to replace a “fragmented
collection of Federal and State laws providing inadequate cleanup and damage
remedies, taxpayer subsidies to cover cleanup costs, third party damages that go
uncompensated, and substantial barriers to victim recoveries . . . .” Id. at 2.
59. The three other statutes are the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-627, 88 Stat. 2176 (1978) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–24
(2006)); the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87
Stat. 576 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2006)); and
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OCSLA’s title III, leaving untouched the 1978 TAD amendment.
OPA, B-1 Bundle itself confirms, “governs . . . private claims for
property damage and economic loss resulting from a discharge of
oil in navigable waters.”60
B. Summary of the Argument
This Essay advances three fundamental claims. First, the
Macondo blowout does not satisfy Executive Jet’s SRTMA criterion
(Part II). Second, B-1 Bundle’s insistence that admiralty law applies
“of its own force” to the Macondo blowout fails because it repeats
the error of the Fifth Circuit’s 1961 opinion in Snipes v. Pure Oil
Company.61 The Supreme Court undermined Snipes in Rodrigue by
holding that torts occurring on OCSLA situses are governed by
OCSLA, rather than admiralty law, unless Congress expresses a
contrary intent (Part III). Third, the Deepwater Horizon MODU is a
hybrid capable of assuming identity under OPA as either a
“vessel”62 or as an “offshore facility”63–“Outer Continental Shelf
facility.”64 With respect to the Macondo Tort, the MODU was
functioning as the latter rather than as a vessel when the OCS
blowout occurred (Part IV).
Part II’s discussion of the SRTMA issue finds Robertson–B-1
Bundle’s insistence that Macondo OCS oil and gas drilling is
SRTMA-compliant bluntly repudiated in the Supreme Court’s
contrary characterization of OCS drilling operations. This review
carefully disassociates the Court’s portrayal of these operations
from OCSLA’s section 1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law issues, for

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). Foreshadowing a
cardinal conclusion of the author’s pending portrayal of OCSLA–OPA’s substantial
displacement of general maritime law, the comprehensiveness of the two
nonadmiralty statutes’ delineation of the Macondo Tort action appears on two
fronts. The first is Congress’s reformulation of general maritime law’s episodic,
conflicting, and, at best, embryonic treatment of the tort. The second is
Congress’s own undertaking in OPA to comprehensively incorporate and
reformulate in a single federal statute its own work in the four prior statutes
identified in text and in this footnote. This extraordinarily extensive undertaking
leaves negligible space for the credibility of any claim that these efforts fall
short of Congress’s effective occupation of a field coextensive with the
boundaries delineated in the Macondo Tort action.
60. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (E.D. La. 2011).
61. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) (2006).
63. Id. § 2701(22).
64. Id. § 2701(25).
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which the distinction between “fixed structures” and MODUs as
TADs has proven decisive in resolving the choice of law question.
Part III disagrees with B-1 Bundle’s application to the
Macondo Tort the three-step test set forth in Union Texas
Petroleum Corporation v. PLT Engineering Corporation (PLT).65
The PLT test’s goal is to determine whether OCSLA-endorsed
state law or admiralty law prevails in OCSLA’s section
1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law contests. Contrary to Professor
Robertson’s insistence on barring MODUs from these contests,66
the Fifth Circuit has held that TADs qualify for the test.67 B-1
Bundle dutifully adheres to the Circuit’s position.68
Part III’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, MODUs
became proper candidates for the section 1333(a)(2)(A) contest no
later than the 1978 addition of TADs to OCSLA section
1333(a)(1).69 Second, because Macondo is a tort originating from
two qualified OCSLA situses, Rodrigue precludes the application
of admiralty law to them. Rodrigue teaches that admiralty law will
not displace OCSLA with respect to such torts absent Congress’s
expression of its intent favoring displacement.70
Part III recognizes the Fifth Circuit’s position, as reflected in
Theriot, that judges can more easily favor displacement by
admiralty law in contract-based causes of action, even for events
occurring on OCSLA situses. The Circuit’s “focus-of-the-contract”
standard affords greater latitude for this outcome than does the
OCSLA tort’s rigid physical location standard.71 Part III views
65. 895 F.2d 1043, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1990).
66. See David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s
Provisions on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice of Law: Correcting the Fifth
Circuit’s Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 534–35, 541–42 (2007).
67. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir.
2002), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor
Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009); PLT, 895 F.2d at 1047–48.
68. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (E.D. La. 2011).
69. Speaking to OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s amendment in 1987, the
Conference Committee characterized the initiative as “technical and perfecting
and [as] meant to restate and clarify and not change existing law.” H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 95-1474, at 80 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1679.
This language may plausibly be understood as indicating that the term “fixed
structures” as used in the 1953 version of OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) should
not be read as excluding the eventual inclusion of MODUs within it. MODUs
did not come into use until the late 1950s. See PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note
47, at 22–25. If the intent of the phrase “fixed structures,” as used in 1953, were
to include only rigs extant at that time, the Conference Committee’s 1978
statement becomes gibberish.
70. See infra text accompanying note 107.
71. See Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 781
(5th Cir. 2009) (en banc); JMARC, supra note 28, at 518 n.40.
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Theriot as inapt, however, not only because it is a non-OCSLA,
territorial waters case, but also because it sounds in contract under
facts that persuaded the court that the indemnity contract in
question was “maritime.”
Part IV disputes that general maritime law alone resolves the
status of the Deepwater Horizon MODU as a “vessel.” Citing the
distinctions dividing the Model from the Macondo Tort, it finds the
Robison line of authority classifying MODUs as vessels unsuitable
for the latter, however appropriate it may be for the Model.
Agreeing with Fifth Circuit Judge Henry Politz’s endorsement of
Judge Brown’s counsel that “the term ‘vessel’ for Jones Act
purposes . . . is [not] necessarily a vessel for other purposes as
well,”72 Part IV advances the concept of MODUs as hybrids, the
proper classification of which depends upon the purpose for and
setting within which the classification is sought. Part IV also
observes that Judge Barbier’s B-1 Bundle rejection of TADs as a
hybrid concept seems out of step with his apparent willingness to
endorse the hybrid analogy in a subsequent MDL opinion.73
II. THE MACONDO BLOWOUT: “SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO A
TRADITIONAL MARITIME ACTIVITY”?
A. OCSLA’s Legislative History, Rodrigue, Herb’s Welding, and
Grubart
OCSLA’s legislative history, as further amplified by the United
States Supreme Court, is unkind to the Robertson74–B-1 Bundle75
view that the Macondo blowout is “substantially related to a
traditional maritime activity.” Failure to satisfy this requirement, of
course, dooms the blowout’s status as an admiralty tort, whether or
not the Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel.”
Robertson and B-1 Bundle invoke Theriot and the Supreme
Court’s Foremost Insurance Company v. Richardson76 decisions.
But these choices are not up to the task assigned to them. Indeed,
72. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049,
1053 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co.
v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (5th Cir. May
1981)), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope v. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp., 484
U.S. 1067 (1988).
73. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (E.D. La. 2012); infra text
accompanying notes 130–31.
74. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346.
75. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011).
76. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
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Foremost’s facts––the collision of two pleasure boats on a
Louisiana river—afford a strikingly awkward choice for an inquiry
as fact-sensitive in relation to Macondo’s OCS drilling-operations
context as the SRTMA principle demands.
The factually appropriate precedents, which Robertson and B-1
Bundle exclude in their SRTMA analyses,77 appear in the Supreme
Court’s portrayal in Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding of Congress’s
and its own conception of OCS oil and gas operations. Likewise
pertinent, but overlooked even though closer to home, are
decisions within the Fifth Circuit itself that also find particular
OCS drilling operations non-SRTMA compliant.78
At issue in Rodrigue was the familiar choice between OCSLAendorsed law and admiralty law to govern accidental deaths
occurring atop fixed platforms. The Court chose the former because
admiralty’s Death on the High Seas Act,79 which covers events on
the “high seas,” failed to override OCSLA’s more specific targeting
of these platforms for the OCSLA alternative.80 Herb’s Welding
ruled that because OCS operations are not “maritime commerce,” a
welder injured atop one of these platforms could not recover under
the LHWCA because he was not an employee engaged in “maritime
employment” under section 902(3).81
These cases are not featured for these holdings as such, but for
their mapping of a relationship between OCS drilling operations
and admiralty law, espoused by Congress and the Supreme Court
alike, that cannot be squared with the conclusion that OCS drilling
is SRTMA-compliant.
Rodrigue’s account of their dissonance is unyielding.
Reversing two Fifth Circuit decisions favoring admiralty law over
77. Both sources bring the cases cited in text into play in the OCSLA
section 1333(a)(2) choice-of-law context, in which the distinction among
different types of OCS platforms may prove outcome determinative. But the
character of a drilling rig does not drive the SRTMA outcome; the activity of
engaging in OCS drilling operations does. See infra text accompanying notes
87–96. While relevant to the Fifth Circuit Model addressing tortious injury or
death of on-platform workers, moreover, the distinction is less convincing when
applied to the quite different population of coastal and inland plaintiffs who
suffer economic and property loss in consequence of an OCSLA situs-based oil
discharge. See supra text accompanying notes 26–48.
78. See, e.g., Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered
Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 760, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on reh’g, 453 F.3d
652 (5th Cir. 2006); Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827
F.2d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope v. Houston
Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988).
79. 46 U.S.C. § 30301–30308 (2006).
80. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 359 (1969).
81. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 421–24 (1985).
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OCSLA, the Court stated that the Senate committee deliberating
OCSLA ’53 “was acutely aware of the inaptness of admiralty law.
The bill applied the same law as to the seabed and subsoil, as well
as to the artificial islands, and admiralty law was obviously
unsuited to that task.”82
Reinforcing this dour assessment is the Court’s response to an
admiralty expert’s testimony at an OCSLA ’53 hearing that
“[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the
resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill
adapted for that purpose.”83 The Court declared that “[s]ince
[OCSLA] treats seabed, subsoil, and artificial islands the same,
dropping any reference to special treatment for presumptive
vessels, the most sensible interpretation of Congress’s reaction to
this testimony is that admiralty treatment was eschewed
altogether. . . .”84
The SRTMA claim fares no better in Herb’s Welding. The
Court excoriated as “untenable” the Circuit’s view that “offshore
drilling is maritime commerce.”85 Herb’s Welding’s explicit
confirmation of and reference to the Court’s assessment in
Rodrigue that OCSLA’s legislative history “at the very least
forecloses the Court of Appeals’ holding that offshore drilling is a
maritime activity . . . ”86 would seem to leave precious little space
for the Robertson–B-1 Bundle position.
Professor Robertson seeks to save his argument by
distinguishing Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding from Macondo on the
ground that the former featured fixed drilling platforms, not
Transocean’s temporarily attached MODU.87 In line with
Theriot,88 he invokes a Herb’s Welding footnote stating that:

82. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 364–65 (emphasis added).
83. Outer Continental Shelf: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 668 (1953) (statement of Richard
Young, Esq.) (emphasis added).
84. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 365, n.12 (emphasis added).
85. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). Professor Robertson
criticizes my reliance on Herb’s Welding because the platforms in question were
fixed. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. Their status as either fixed or
temporarily attached, however, is not dispositive of the issue addressed in text.
See infra text accompanying notes 89–96.
86. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
87. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. B-1 Bundle concedes that the
argument “has appeal,” B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951, 952 (E.D. La.
2011), but yields to contrary Fifth Circuit precedent, particularly as set forth in
PLT, see Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g Corp., 895 F.2d 1043,
1047–48 (5th Cir. 1990).
88. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 539 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986).
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[o]ffshore oil rigs are of two general sorts: fixed and
floating. Floating structures have been treated as vessels by
the lower courts. Workers on them, unlike workers on fixed
platforms, enjoy the same remedies as workers on ships. If
permanently attached to the vessel as crewmembers, they
are regarded as seamen; if not, they are covered by the
LHWCA because they are employed on navigable waters.89
The fixed versus floating structure distinction, Part I confirms,
has indeed proven influential in scores of personal injury–death
tort actions brought by or on behalf of on-platform workers. But
Part I likewise confirms the error of claiming that the same
distinction should govern the outcome of a SRTMA inquiry
addressing Macondo economic and property loss claimants. The
Theriot and Grubart discussions immediately below establish,
moreover, that the vessel–location admiralty tort requirement,
which does engage OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), is separate and
distinct from the SRTMA compliance requirement. Each must be
satisfied independently of the other to ground admiralty
jurisdiction under the Executive Jet line of cases.90
B. Theriot and Pippen
Theriot merits meticulous scrutiny, not only because Professor
Robertson extols it,91 but also because it is the sole basis upon
which B-1 Bundle ruled that Macondo’s OCS exploratory well
drilling operations are SRTMA-compliant.92 “Oil and gas drilling
on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime
commerce,” Theriot baldly asserts,93 leaving the task of defending
its diktat to Pippen v. Shell Oil Company.94
But neither Theriot nor Pippen can bear the weight assigned to
it. As previously noted, the contrary view of ocean-based drilling
operations embraced in Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding cannot be
89. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 416 n.2 (citations omitted).
90. The OCSLA inquiry does not drive the SRTMA inquiry’s outcome, but
there will be instances when the latter will drive the former. PLT Step 2 of the
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law analysis accords priority to
admiralty law over OCSLA-endorsed law when, inter alia, the admiralty law
applies “of its own force.” In disputes featuring non-SRTMA compliant
activities, admiralty law cannot be said to apply of its own force because the
underlying activities fail to trigger admiralty jurisdiction and law in the first
instance. See cases cited supra note 78; JMARC, supra note 28, at 557–60.
91. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346.
92. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011).
93. Theriot, 783 F.2d at 538–39.
94. 661 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981).
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dismissed on the basis asserted in Theriot and by Professor
Robertson that scenarios featuring semisubmersibles are ipso facto
SRTMA-compliant.
Hostile to this claim for essentially the same reason is Jerome
B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company.95 The
Court’s analysis of Executive Jet’s duo of location–vessel and
SRTMA elements rules out meshing the two (as in the expression
“drilling for oil from a vessel”). Hence, the instrumentality of OCS
drilling (a “vessel on navigable waters”) must be examined
independently from the activity it enables (“oil and gas drilling”)
and vice-versa. “Because the injuries suffered by Grubart and the
other flood victims were caused by a vessel on navigable waters,”
the Supreme Court carefully spells out, “the location inquiry would
seem to be at an end.”96 Only after bookending this inquiry does
the Court turn to Grubart’s SRTMA issue.
No less problematic is Theriot’s or, derivatively, B-1 Bundle’s
reliance on Pippen to justify offshore drilling’s SRTMA
compliance. Not only does Pippen fail to provide any support for
its ukase that “offshore drilling [sic] the discovery, recovery, and
sale of oil and natural gas from the sea bottom is maritime
commerce,”97 but Pippen’s identification of oil-drilling operations
with “maritime commerce” was expressly rebuffed in the Supreme
Court’s Herb’s Welding opinion.98
At issue in Pippen was whether Mr. Pippen’s injury while
performing wireline services on a drilling barge was incurred in
“maritime employment,” which would entitle him to compensation
under the LHWCA as a section 902(3) “employee.” The “offshore
drilling . . . is maritime commerce” statement appears as the
unsupported minor premise of a syllogism designed to prove that
Pippen’s duties have a “realistically significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity.”99 The syllogism’s major premise,
according to the court, is that a “significant relationship” exists
“when the purpose of the employee’s activities is to facilitate
maritime commerce.”100 With the insertion of the unsupported
vessel-based drilling is maritime commerce minor premise, the
95. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
96. Id. at 535.
97. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384.
98. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 419 (1985). Herb’s Welding
explains that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion below was expressly predicated on
Pippen’s earlier holding that activities integral to OCS drilling operations are
“maritime commerce.” Id.
99. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384 n.10.
100. Id. at 383–84.
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conclusion links Pippen’s activity to the “realistically significant
relationship to maritime commerce.”
Even absent the contrary portrayal of offshore drilling in
Rodrigue, Herb’s Welding, and conforming Fifth Circuit opinions,
Pippen’s premise that the mere statement of a position secures its
validation equates to little more than a tautology, a “reflexive”
rather than a reasoned response.
III. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON: AN OCSLA SITUS TO WHICH
ADMIRALTY LAW DOES NOT APPLY?
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence endorses the view that TADs merit
status as OCSLA situses under the first step of the PLT analysis
superintended under OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A).101 PLT
presents the latter as requiring a three-step inquiry that selects
admiralty law absent satisfaction of any of three elements: (1) the
event must occur on an OCSLA situs; (2) admiralty law must not
apply to the event “of its own force”; and (3) the nonadmiralty
alternative (OCSLA-endorsed state law) must be consistent with
“other federal law,” as required by OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A).
Applied to the Macondo Tort, Step 1 favors OCSLA in light of
the Circuit’s agreement that OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) situses
merit inclusion in the PLT calculus.
Step 2, Robertson and B-1 Bundle insist, defeats OCSLA
because they deem admiralty law to apply “of its own force.” This
is so, they claim, because the Macondo Tort satisfies both poles of
Executive Jet: OCS drilling is SRTMA-compliant, and the MODU
is a “vessel in navigable waters.”
Part II’s examination of Theriot–Pippen and Rodrigue–Herb’s
Welding exposes the implausibility of the first claim.
The general maritime law-based “vessel” claim is unpersuasive
on two separate grounds. The first, addressed in Part IV, is that
Robertson and B-1 Bundle err in seeking to resolve the Deepwater
Horizon’s status under nonstatutory general maritime law. The
proper focus for their gaze is instead OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s
language and legislative history, OPA’s subsequent adoption, and,
in this Macondo setting, OCSLA–OPA’s targeting of off-platform,
101. See cases cited supra note 67. Consistent with this acknowledgement,
B-1 Bundle likewise treats the Deepwater Horizon, an OCSLA section
1333(a)(1) MODU, as an OCSLA situs under the PLT Step 1 analysis. It then
appeals to Theriot under PLT Step 2 to conclude, inter alia, that because OCS
drilling is SRTMA-qualified, admiralty law applies of its own accord, thereby
barring selection of the OCSLA-endorsed state law. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 950–52 (E.D. La. 2011).
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economic-loss claimants rather than of injured or deceased seamen
or platform workers.
The second rationale is set forth directly in Rodrigue itself.
Rodrigue clashed with the Fifth Circuit’s Snipes v. Pure Oil
Company decision,102 which, in another manifestation of the
Circuit’s reflexive admiralty-centrism, defined as “maritime” a
tortious injury suffered by an OCS stationary platform worker at
this OCSLA site. Rodrigue countered that admiralty law does not
apply to torts originating on OCSLA situses unless Congress
affirmatively expresses its “intent” favoring this override.
MODUs qualify as OCSLA situses under Rodrigue, now
updated to take account of OCSLA ’78’s addition of “temporarily
attached devices” alongside OCSLA ’53’s “fixed structures.”103
The Death on the High Seas Act104 failed as an expression of this
intent, the Court ruled in Rodrigue, because the Act covered events
occurring on the “high seas,” not those originating on an OCSLA
situs.105 Rodrigue’s accidents occurred on the fixed platforms in
question, which Congress analogized to “artificial islands” that
would not have been subject to “traditional maritime principles”
pre-OCSLA in any event.106
But the Court stated that it would have made no difference
even if the platforms had been subject to these principles. The
102. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
103. Although not advanced by Robertson–B-1 Bundle, the objection can be
anticipated that while the Macondo oil originated from OSLA situses, it satisfied
Executive Jet’s location requirement when it made its way into the high seas and
territorial waters. But Congress enacted OCSLA under the Property Clause and
the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause, not under the Admiralty Clause.
See infra notes 125–26. Congress’s Property Clause powers were deemed
essentially limitless in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), and
were endorsed as extending to the “regulation of conduct on or off the public
land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands.” Minnesota v.
Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1982). Congress’s OCSLA goals include
the generation of federal revenue and the protection of the United States’
economic and security interests by insuring unhampered federal control of OCS
oil reserves. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 526–34. But these goals were
frustrated in the 1970s by post-Santa Barbara Channel spill drilling moratoria
sought by coastal states fearful of similar environmental, pollution, and
economic threats to their coasts and residents. Id. at 540–44. OCSLA ’78 and,
subsequently, OPA, were adopted, as per Block, to “regulate conduct . . . off the
public land [viz. the high seas and state waters] that would threaten the
designated purpose of federal lands [viz. the OCS].” Block, 660 F.2d at 1249.
Hence, the position expressed in notes 125 and 126 that as a nonadmiralty
initiative, the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort regime neither incorporates nor
derives from admiralty law or jurisdiction.
104. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (2006).
105. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 366 (1969).
106. Id. at 360–61.
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Court’s language favoring this conclusion could not be more
forthright:
Even if the admiralty law would have applied to the deaths
occurring in these cases under traditional principles,
[OCSLA’s] legislative history shows that Congress did not
intend that result. First, Congress assumed that the
admiralty law would not apply [to an OCSLA situs] unless
Congress made it apply, and then Congress decided not to
make it apply.107
Likewise unavailing is any claim under PLT Step 3 that the
nonadmiralty alternative is defeated by “inconsistent” federal law,
taking the form in this instance of judge-made general maritime
law. The argument is an ill-conceived attempt to reject admiralty
law’s prior repudiation under Step 2. It ignores, moreover, that
OCSLA itself is “other federal law” which, by deeming MODUs
OCSLA situses, speaks directly to the matter inconsistently
resolved by the former. Along with OPA, Professor Robertson
agrees that OCSLA “necessarily displace[s] anything in maritime
common law deemed inconsistent with the statute’s provisions.”108
A comparison of this conception of the PLT test’s application to
Macondo with the majority and dissenting opinions’ treatment of the
issue in Demette affords an instructive bridge to Part IV’s discussion
of the Deepwater Horizon’s status under OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)
and OPA section 2701. Like Theriot, Demette posed the question of
a MODU’s status in conjunction with an indemnity contract dispute
arising out of a platform worker’s injury.109 In Demette, however,
the platform, owned by the company suing the worker’s employer
for defense and indemnity, was located on the OCS, not in territorial
waters. The court looked to the PLT test to address the employer’s
claim that OCSLA-endorsed Louisiana law governed the indemnity
contact’s validity.110
The court viewed itself as facing three choices in determining
the status of the MODU under PLT Step 1 and, derivatively, under
107. Id. at 361. Equally explicit is the Court’s reassertion of its Rodrigue
holding in Herb’s Welding: OCSLA’s legislative history, the Court declared,
establishes that “Congress was of the view that maritime law would not apply to
fixed platforms unless a statute expressly so provided . . . .” Herb’s Welding v.
Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985) (emphasis added).
108. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345.
109. The MODU is this instance was a jack-up vessel, which Demette
categorized as a “special-purpose movable drilling rig[].” Demette v. Falcon
Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds
by Grand Isle Shipyard Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
110. Id. at 500–01.
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Step 2. The first was that of the injured worker’s employer: the
MODU is a “vessel” and, as such, fails as an OCSLA section
1333(a)(1) situs that qualifies for review under section
1333(a)(2)(A).111 The latter section refers only to “artificial islands
and fixed structures,” omitting any reference to section
1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached devices.” The second choice is
that approved by the Demette majority: the MODU is a “vessel,”
but it is also an OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) situs that merits review
under section 1333(a)(2)(A) despite the foregoing omission.112 The
third choice is that of Judge DeMoss in dissent: the MODU is not a
general maritime law “vessel” because the legislative history of
OCSLA’s 1978 amendment establishes that TADs and “vessels”
are mutually exclusive.113 Absent a “vessel,” the platform injury
loses its foundation in admiralty, rendering the section
1333(a)(2)(A) choice of law contest superfluous.114
The Demette majority merits qualified praise for going
somewhat beyond a simplistic assertion of the general maritime
law definition of vessel in its inquiry. But it continued to honor
pre-OCSLA ’78, territorial-waters Robison as establishing “beyond
doubt”115 that MODUs retain their identify as vessels even as it
concluded that MODUs also double up as section 1333(a)(1)
OCSLA situses.116
IV. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON MODU: VESSEL, OFFSHORE
FACILITY–OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OFFSHORE FACILITY,
HERMAPHRODITE, OR HYBRID?
Were affairs in 2010 as they were in 1978, Judge DeMoss’s
view that MODUs and “vessels” are mutually exclusive would be
difficult to challenge. The legislative history of two principal
111. Id. at 498.
112. Id. at 498–500, 504.
113. Id. at 506–11 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 508 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Judge DeMoss’s position is
considerably more hostile to Fifth Circuit Model reasoning than appears in text.
He also insisted that PLT Step 2, which probes whether admiralty law applies of
its own accord, is misconceived because OCSLA rules out admiralty law as a
permissible alternative altogether. Id. at 505 n.2 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 498, n.18.
116. A skeptic may be pardoned for questioning the latter characterization’s
significance, however, given Demette’s contract setting. The plasticity of
standards for declaring a contact “maritime” opens an easy route to ruling under
PLT Step 2 that admiralty law applies of its own accord even for events
occurring on OCS platforms, an option the court in fact exercised. This option is
not available in the Macondo setting because, again, B-1 Bundle claims sound in
tort, not contract.
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OCSLA amendments––those adding TADs to OCSLA section
1333(a)(1) and a new title III—establish that the “new statutory
regime” envisioned by Congress demands no less.
But the clarity of this picture diminished in 1990 with
Congress’s adoption of OPA in 1990. Congress left untouched
MODUs’ status as TADs, a reality that Judge DeMoss, alone
among his Fifth Circuit colleagues, has taken seriously. But
Congress also repealed title III and included an OPA 2701(37)
definition for “vessels” duplicating the Stewart model. On the
other hand, it declared that MODUs are “vessel[s] capable of use
as . . . offshore facilit[ies]” and then defined “offshore facilit[ies]”
expressly to exclude “vessels.”117 It further reinforced MODUs’
status as offshore facilities by bringing them within its definition of
an “Outer Continental Shelf facility,”118 as an offshore facility
employed, like the Deepwater Horizon, in OCS resource
operations.
Hence, the question: Should the “vessel” label be attached
under OPA to the Deepwater Horizon MODU, which is a
confirmed OCSLA situs as well as a TAD, when it is also
functioning as an OPA twin-offshore–Outer Continental Shelf
facility? Stated alternatively, Should MODUs be regarded as
hermaphrodites, that is, “vessels,” even when functioning in a
nonvessel mode, or as hybrids, shifting between the status solely of
“vessels” or solely of “offshore facilities” depending upon the
context in which the issue is raised and the use assigned to the
MODU when the tort occurs? Pertinent to the latter dimension, of
course, is the view proposed in Part I that a MODU is a vessel in
the context of on-platform accidental deaths or injuries but sheds
that status when analyzed in the Macondo Tort setting.
Earlier discussion disclosed Congress’s 1978 institution of its
“new [OCSLA] statutory regime.” Combined in a single act were
the additions of TADs alongside the “fixed structures” of 1953 and
the title III prevention–liability regime, the precursor of the OPA
’90 regime.
The Conference Committee explained that the former clarified
that federal law is to be applicable to all activities on all
devices in contact with the seabed for exploration,
development, and production. The committee intends that
federal law is, therefore, to be applicable to activities on
drilling ships, semi-submersible drilling rigs, and other
watercraft, when they are connected to the seabed by
117. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(18), (22) (2006).
118. Id. § 2701(25).
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drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS for
exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships
and vessels are specifically not covered [only] when they
are being used for the purpose of transporting OCS
mineral resources.119
The House described title III’s function as providing the
“procedures to be followed in the event of an oilspill and
compensation for cleanup costs and damages resulting from such a
spill.”120 The title limits the definition of “vessels” to watercraft
operating in OCS or territorial waters and which transport “oil
directly from an offshore facility.”121 An “offshore facility,” it
stated, is “any oil refinery, [or] drilling structure[,] . . . which is
used to drill for, produce[,] . . . or transport oil produced from the
Outer Continental Shelf . . . .”122
These definitions exclude semisubmersibles as “vessels” by
including them under “any drilling structure.” The term “vessel” is
restricted to any watercraft used exclusively to “[transport] oil
directly from an offshore facility.” Hence the statement of the
conferees:
[O]nce a drilling ship or other watercraft is attached to the
seabed for exploration, development or production, it is to
be considered an “offshore facility” rather than a vessel,
for purposes of applying the differing requirements for a
facility as compared to a vessel.123
Congress’s goals for this strengthened regime, the
amendment’s legislative history, and the unique OCSLA–OPA
Macondo Tort action reinforce Judge DeMoss’s conclusion, if
applied to the Macondo setting, that
there is absolutely no question at all that these . . . changes
eliminate the basis for any distinction which our case law
may have made in the past between a “jack-up rig” being a
vessel and a “fixed platform” not being a vessel, insofar as
activities on the Outer Continental Shelf are concerned.124
119. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1584.
121. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-372, § 301(5), 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
122. Id. at § 301(8).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 179 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1585 (emphasis added).
124. Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 507 (5th Cir. 2002)
(DeMoss, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard
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In fact, OCSLA ’78’s section 1333(a), its title III OCS
economic- and property-loss cause of action, and the latter’s
refinement and expansion in OPA are not creatures of admiralty at
all. They are instead independently grounded in the Constitution’s
Property125 and Interstate and Foreign Commerce clauses,126
respectively.
B. OPA 1990
Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA and repeal of
OCSLA’s title III injected definitional uncertainties not present in
OCSLA ’78. These ambiguities are inventoried in Part IV’s lead
paragraph, which also stresses that any claim that MODUs are
“vessels” must contend with Congress’s decision to preserve
OCSLA’s TAD language.
Judges sharing the Circuit’s admiralty reflex, however, will
conclude that these changes secure the Deepwater Horizon’s status
as a “vessel.” As in B-1 Bundle, they will seize on the inclusion in
OPA of a Stewart-duplicating definition of “vessel”127 and
embrace even more tightly the half-century of Robison’s line of
authority equating MODU-type rigs with “vessels.”128 Likewise,
they will simply ignore the dissonance posed by MODUs’
unmodified status as OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) TADs129 and the
categorical tone of the foregoing congressional explanation that

Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). Professor Robertson
and B-1 Bundle disagree with Judge DeMoss’s assessment. See Robertson,
supra note 2, at 345; B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 & n.4 (E.D. La.
2011). However, like the Demette majority, neither undertakes to refute his
position’s invocation of and reliance on OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s TAD
language and the uncompromising additional support founded in the legislative
history quoted supra text accompanying notes 119–24 and infra text
accompanying notes 125–26. Sometimes, it appears, a statute is simply too
inconvenient to merit attention.
125. “Congress,” the Senate’s Ad Hoc Committee stated in its report on the
OCSLA ’78 amendments, “has a special constitutional responsibility to make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States” under the Property Clause. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 54
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461.
126. OCSLA, Judge Rubin has stated, “depends on national sovereignty and
the commerce clause; the cause of action it creates is one arising out of a general
federal statute, and federal court jurisdiction depends on the existence of a
federal question.” Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.12 (5th Cir.
1982).
127. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
128. Id. at 949.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 111–16.
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“federal law is to be applicable [both] to all activities on all
devices in contact with the seabed . . . ” and to MODUs when they
“are connected to the seabed by drillstrings, pipes or other
appurtenances.”
For them, MODUs are hermaphrodites: both vessels and TADs
at all times, hence pillars of admiralty jurisdiction.
Or at least, that is the course that Judge Barbier championed in
B-1 Bundle. But, in a subsequent MDL decision, he entertained the
possibility that MODUs are hybrids.130 Recalling OPA’s treatment
of MODUs as “vessels capable of use as offshore facilities,” and of
offshore facilities as any facility “other than a vessel,” he reasoned
that
[a]s the words “other than a vessel” in [the OPA section
2701(22) definition of “offshore facility”] indicate, vessels
and offshore facilities typically are mutually exclusive
categories. However, OPA provides a hybrid definition for
MODUs: “‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ means a vessel . . .
capable of use as an offshore facility.” In the MODU
context, then, the responsible party is determined by how the
MODU was used at the time of the incident . . . . When the
MODU is not being used as an offshore facility––such as
when it is moving from one drilling location to another—the
MODU is treated as a vessel and the responsible party is the
owner/operator of the MODU (the responsible party for a
vessel). When the MODU is being used as an offshore
facility––i.e., when the MODU is “exploring for, drilling for,
producing, [etc.] . . . oil” “in , on, or under . . . navigable
waters”––then the responsible party is the lessee (the
responsible party for an offshore facility).131
The issue before the court concerned a matter that falls outside
of this Essay’s concerns.132 But directly relevant is the court’s
130. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. La. 2012).
131. Id. at 750 (emphasis by Barbier, J.) (citations omitted).
132. The issue concerned the extent of Transocean’s liability for damages
and response costs as a “responsible party” by virtue of its ownership of the
Deepwater Horizon MODU. Transocean argued that section 2704(b)(1) limited
its liability to that of a “tank vessel” (as set forth in OPA section 2704(a)(1)). In
light of the hybrid default position endorsed by the court in language quoted in
text, the Deepwater Horizon would not have been a “vessel” because it was
being used as an “offshore facility” when the blowout occurred. But the court
reasoned that OPA section 2704(b)(1) sets forth an exception in this case based
on the section’s language that a MODU “which is being used as an offshore
facility is deemed to be a tank vessel with respect to the discharge . . . of oil on
or above the surface of the water.” Id. at 751.
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seeming inclination to regard the hybrid concept for MODUs as
the proper default interpretation. Fidelity to the court’s attention to
“context” and to “how the MODU was used at the time of the
incident” favors the hybrid over the hermaphrodite classification in
evaluating the purported admiralty status of the Macondo OCSLA–
OPA tort. Because the Deepwater Horizon–MODU was being used
as an “offshore facility–OCS offshore facility” when the blowout
occurred, this second MDL opinion would seem not to favor the
MODU’s classification as a “vessel.”
Additional considerations support this interpretation.
Beginning with the statute from which OPA’s “vessel” definition
actually derives,133 Congress qualified the latter with a caveat
calling for its application “unless the context indicates
otherwise.”134 For the Macondo Tort, the context’s leading
elements are the prior OCSLA ’78 “polluter pays” regime that
OPA carried forward, section 1333(a)(1) and its intact TAD
language, and congressional purposes driving Macondo’s tort–
economic loss cause of action.
It is difficult to deny that the Macondo context does “indicate
otherwise” because none of these elements favors dressing this
decidedly nonadmiralty undertaking in admiralty whites. Judge
Politz along with Judge Brown surely evidenced a more discerning
awareness of context in their caution that “the term ‘vessel’ for
Jones Act purposes . . . is [not] necessarily a vessel for other
purposes as well.”135
Treating MODUs as hybrids, moreover, does no harm to
Robison’s longstanding goal of supporting injured or deceased
platform workers. Judges remain free as they have been for a half
century to deem the Deepwater Horizon a “vessel” in actions
brought on behalf of its deceased or injured platform workers.
But the reverse is not true. Endowing MODUs permanent
vessel status even when they are functioning as nonvessels
mandates admiralty law’s entrance even though its claim is likely
to be weak or failing under either or both of Executive Jet’s tests.
More immediate to the Macondo Tort, doing so has provided
dubious support for B-1 Bundle’s related position observed
earlier,136 that general maritime law has survived OCSLA and
OPA largely unscathed.
Considerably more plausible than the MODU-ashermaphrodite thesis is a two-step understanding of the linkage of
133.
134.
135.
136.

1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 72.
See supra note 8.
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the TAD language to OPA’s liability regime. The first
acknowledges that OCSLA ’78 presented the TAD and title III
amendments in an integrated OCSLA statutory format. The second
recognizes that Congress split them in 1990, leaving the TAD
element intact in OCSLA while drawing OCSLA’s former title III
and similar liability provisions from three other oil pollution
statutes within OPA. This understanding would carry forward to
the post-1990 OCSLA–OPA, which combined the nonvessel
concept of MODUs initiated in the OCSLA ’78 integration of the
TAD language and title III.137 Certainly nothing in OPA’s
legislative history suggests Congress’s desire to diminish rather
than enhance the statutory punch of a combined OCSLA–OPA
foundation for the Macondo Tort.
Finally, Professor Robertson’s favored approach precipitates
open warfare between OCSLA and OPA, in which one or the other
must yield. Professor Robertson would discard OCSLA, moreover,
on the basis of his claim that it has been repealed, presumably by
judicially disfavored implication, because the statute is “older, less
comprehensive, and less specific respecting oil spill liability.”138
But there is no need to go down this path because
accommodation is easily achieved under the hybrid approach.
Professor Robertson’s awkward offering posits, moreover, that
Congress expressly repealed one element of OCSLA––title III––at
the same time that it implicitly repealed a second more salient
provision––the 1333(a)(1) TAD language—which it recognized as
central to its refashioning of oil pollution-discharge liability only
12 years earlier. If Congress wished to cancel both elements, its
obvious route was expressly to repeal both, rather than to leave
repeal of the TAD language to the surmise of a future court.
Likewise problematic are the grounds Professor Robertson
cites for selecting OPA over OCSLA. Although OCSLA was
originally adopted in 1953, Congress’s decision to leave the 1978
section 1333(a)(1) intact occurred concurrently with OPA’s
adoption in 1990. A claim of OCSLA’s lesser “specificity” makes
sense, moreover, only if Professor Robertson’s equation of the
Macondo blowout with a “vessel-related oil spill . . . into state
waters” makes sense.139 But it does not. Reduction of the OCSLA
blowout to this state-waters mode carries with it the astonishing
consequence of vaporizing not only OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s
TAD language but also the entirety of sections 1333(a)(1) and
137. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
138. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345.
139. Id.
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1333(a)(2)(A), neither of which is operative for events originating
in state waters.
Likewise negated is the Supreme Court’s embrace of OCSLA
as “defin[ing] a body of law applicable to the seabed, the subsoil
and the . . . structures . . . on the Outer Continental Shelf.”140
Finally, OPA’s near-total silence concerning the OCS141
undermines the override claim by positioning OCSLA as the more
specific statute on OCS matters and, hence, as an indispensable
guide to its core concern, OCS resource extractive operations.

140. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
141. Excluding OPA’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility” definition and a
single related provision, OPA section 2704(c)(3) (dealing with the allocation of
financial liability as between such facilities and a “vessel”), OPA is silent
concerning the OCS.

